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Alaska's Cap on Noneconomic
Damages: Unfair, Unwise and
Unconstitutional
As part of the 1986 tort reform, the Alaska Legislature placed a
limit of $500,000 on the amount a victim could recover in
noneconomic damages in any action based upon negligence. The
limit was intended to help alleviate what was considered to be a
crisis in the affordability and availability of liability insurance.
Although the Alaska Supreme Court has yet to assess the
constitutionality of the $500,000 limit, similar provisions have been
challenged on various constitutional grounds in several other
states. This note examines the case law from other jurisdictions
and assesses how it might impact the Alaska Supreme Court's
evaluation of the constitutionality of Alaska's damages limitation.
This note concludes that the cap violates both the equal protection
and the right to jury trial clauses of the Alaska Constitution.
I. NTRODUCTION
During the mid-1980's, nearly every state adopted some sort
of tort reform. The avowed purpose of these initiatives was to
alleviate the perceived crisis in personal injury litigation. State
legislatures expressed concern about the decreasing availability and
rising cost of liability insurance.1 The theory behind the various
reforms was relatively simple: By restricting the rights of victims to
recover for their injuries, insurance companies would not be
required to pay as much in settlements and jury verdicts. The
legislature believed this restriction would allow the liability
insurance industry to lower premiums, and, as a result, the general
public would benefit as health care would become more affordable
Copyright © 1994 by Alaska Law Review
1. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-1 (Supp. 1993) (stating that "in recent
years, the cost of insurance coverage has risen dramatically while the nature and
extent of coverage has diminished, leaving the health care providers and the
injured without the full benefit of professional liability insurance coverage").
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and municipalities would be able to provide traditional services
without being driven into bankruptcy.2
The Alaska Legislature in 1986 passed its version of tort
reform, a statute entitled "Limitations on Civil Liability."3 The
first section of this statute limits the amount of noneconomic
damages a plaintiff can recover for an injury based upon negligence
to $500,000.4 The Alaska Supreme Court has yet to rule on the
constitutionality of this provision, but the question will undoubtedly
arise in the future.
This note, in part II, first examines some of the problems that
Alaska trial courts have faced in attempting to apply the damages
limitation provision. Part III surveys case law from other jurisdic-
tions that have ruled on the constitutionality of similar tort reform
statutes. Part IV analyzes some of the constitutional challenges to
the damages cap provision and examines how the Alaska Supreme
Court will likely assess these challenges. The note concludes by
recommending that Alaska Statutes section 09.17.010 be struck
down as violative of both the equal protection and right to jury
trial guarantees of the Alaska Constitution.
II. DFFICULTY PRESENTED BY THE APPLICATION OF ALASKA
STATUTES SECTION 09.17.010
As noted above, the Alaska Supreme Court has yet to rule on
the constitutionality of the Alaska Statutes section 09.17.010.
Lower courts that have faced the issue of when to apply the statute
have not established a consistent standard or approach for
interpreting the damages cap provision. One problem encountered
is the interpretation of the exception: "The [$500,000 noneconomic
damages cap] does not apply to damages for disfigurement or
severe physical impairment."5 By failing to define "disfigurement
or severe physical impairment," the legislature has engendered
confusion among the lower courts, causing them to reach disparate
and unpredictable decisions.
2. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-102 (Supp. 1993) ("The general
assembly determines and declares that it is in the best interests of the citizens of
this state to assure the continued availability of adequate health care services to
the people of this state by containing the significantly increasing costs of
malpractice insurance for medical care institutions and licensed medical care
professionals . . ").
3. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17 (Supp. 1993).
4. Id. § 09.17.010. Noneconomic damages are defined as "compensation for
pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of
enjoyment of life and other nonpecuniary damage." Id.
5. Id- § 09.17.010(c).
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Two superior court opinions, Pleasant v. Navistar International
Transportation Corp.6 and Vanderpool v. Red Devil Corp.7
illustrate such confusion. In Pleasant, the jury found, by way of a
special interrogatory, that the plaintiff had suffered "disfigurement
or severe physical impairment" and awarded $2.4 million in
noneconomic damages' Nonetheless, the defendant maintained
that the award should be reduced to the $500,000 limit because the
jury's special finding was advisory only.' Unpersuaded by this
argument, the court found that the evidence supported the jury's
finding of "disfigurement or severe physical impairment" and
refused to apply the $500,000 cap.'
Conversely, in Vanderpool the court granted the defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of
"severe physical impairment" and reduced the jury's award of
noneconomic damages to $500,000.11 The court concluded that
the plaintiffs injuries did not amount to "severe physical impair-
ment" and that reasonable minds could not differ on this issue. 2
Yet, the plaintiff's injuries in Vanderpool were not unequivocally
less severe than those sustained by the plaintiff in Pleasant.
Indeed, the injuries at issue in the Vanderpool case were arguably
more severe.
In Pleasant, the plaintiff experienced some double vision, but
he could eliminate it by wearing glasses and would eventually be
able to learn to suppress it naturally.3 Just six weeks after the
accident, the plaintiff had returned to work. 4 Moreover, a friend
of the plaintiff testified that he could not discern any difference in
the behavior or physical condition of the plaintiff after the
accident. Despite this description of the plaintiff's condition, the
court specifically stated that the evidence supported the jury's
finding of disfigurement or severe physical impairment. 6
In Vanderpool, the plaintiff injured his knee and ribs in a
backhoe accident.'7 The knee injury was severe enough that
6. No. 4BE-88-007 Ci. (Alaska Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1993).
7. No. 4BE-91-178 CIV. (Alaska Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 1993).
8. Pleasant, slip op. at 22.
9. Id. at 23.
10. Id. at 24.
11. Vanderpool, slip op. at 8.
12. Id.
13. Pleasant, slip op. at 23.
14. Id. at 22.
15. Id. at 23.
16. Id. at 24.
17. Vanderpool, slip op. at 6.
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strenuous physical activity periodically caused pain and swelling."8
The court characterized the rib injury as chronic, since two of the
ribs had not joined. 9 The court also noted that, as a result of the
injuries, the plaintiff could no longer lift objects heavier than forty
pounds or conduct "the physical activities associated with a
subsistence lifestyle."'  Nevertheless, the court held that, by
definition, these injuries did not constitute "severe physical impair-
ment."
21
As the Vanderpool and Pleasant opinions illustrate, the
"disfigurement and severe physical impairment" exception to the
$500,000 limit on noneconomic damages has created confusion at
the trial court level, producing inconsistent and unpredictable
decisions. The problem stems in part from the legislature's lack of
guidance to the courts in how to define "disfigurement and severe
physical impairment." Without such direction, courts have applied
different criteria in making this determination. For example, the
court in Vanderpool referred to Alaska Statutes section
11.81.900(b)(51), a criminal statute that provides for a more severe
penalty in cases where the convicted defendant has caused a
"serious physical injury" to a victim,' for guidance in interpreting
the meaning of "severe physical impairment."' That statute
defines "serious physical injury" as "serious and protracted
disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, protracted loss or
impairment of the function of a body member or organ, or that
[which] unlawfully terminates pregnancy."'24  Although the
Vanderpool court decided after trial that the damages cap should
be applied, it had originally reached the opposite conclusion and
denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the
issue. In denying the defendant's motion, the court concluded
that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the plaintiff's
injury amounted to "severe physical impairment. 2 6 The court
based its ruling in large part upon the definition of "serious
physical injury" found in Alaska Statutes section
11.81.900(b)(51).27
18. Id. at 6-7.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id. at 8.
22. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(51) (Supp. 1993).
23. Vanderpool, slip op. at 2.
24. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(51) (Supp. 1993).
25. Vanderpool, slip op. at 3.
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id. at 2-3.
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After trial, however, the court reversed its position and
granted the defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v., stating that it
was improper to consider the definition provided in the criminal
statute because the legislature adopted it for a different purpose
than the tort reform legislation." Thus, the two statutes "differ
substantially and require differing interpretations of 'severe physical
impairment' and 'serious physical injury."'29  The Vanderpool
court's reconsideration of the issue illustrates just how much
confusion the exception clause of the damages cap has created.
The lack of consistency regarding the same issue, in the same case,
in the very same court, casts doubt on the likelihood of consistency
among the various trial courts.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the court in Pleasant
adopted a different approach. The Pleasant court never looked to
other legislative enactments for guidance, instead submitting to the
jury a special interrogatory on the question of whether the injury
could be characterized as "disfigurement or severe physical
impairment."3 It is unlikely, however, that such a determination,
through a special interrogatory, would end the inquiry in a large
portion of cases. Presumably the court would retain the power to
find that reasonable minds could not differ as to the severity of the
injury and apply the damages cap anyway.
Perhaps one could defend the legislature for failing to precisely
define "disfigurement or severe physical impairment" by arguing
that a determination regarding the severity of a claimant's injury is
inherently subjective. Such an argument, however, only under-
scores the unworkable condition of Alaska's noneconomic damages
limitation. Moreover, one of the purposes of Alaska Statutes
section 09.17 was "to reduce the costs associated with the tort
system."31  Ironically, however, the exception clause in Alaska
Statutes section 09.17.010(c) has created a new battleground for
litigation, only consuming additional judicial resources. In sum, the
additional litigation that the statute has created, as well as the
inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes that the "disfigurement or
severe physical impairment" exception has engendered, provide
strong ammunition for either a due process or equal protection
challenge to Alaska Statutes section 09.17.010.32
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id.
30. Pleasant v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., No. 4BE-88-007 Ci., slip op. at 1
(Alaska Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1993).
31. COMMr=rEE (FINANCE) SUBsTrrUTE FOR ALASKA S. 377, 14th Leg., 2d
Sess. § 1(e) (1986).
32. The erratic outcomes caused by the exception provision illustrate the
arbitrariness of the statute. Under Alaska law, a statute must be "reasonable not
1994]
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
STATUTORY CAPS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The majority of states enacted some type of tort reform in the
1980's. In 1986 alone, the same year in which the state legislature
passed Alaska Statutes section 09.17, more than thirty other states
adopted some type of tort reform." Many of these tort reform
packages contain provisions that place a cap on total damages,
economic and noneconomic combined, while others limit only
noneconomic damages. The constitutionality of these caps has
been challenged in virtually every state except Alaska. Many
courts that have reviewed such statutes have struck them down as
violative of due process, equal protection, right to jury trial or as
a denial of access to the courts.3' Conversely, some courts have
upheld the caps on the ground that they are rationally related to
the state's legitimate goal of lowering liability insurance rates.3
6
A. Equal Protection
A common argument raised by those challenging the constitu-
tionality of damages caps has been that such caps violate the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. The damages limita-
tions create two distinct classifications: victims who suffer injuries
valued at less than the cap and those whose damages exceed the
arbitrary." State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 (Alaska 1973). See infra part IV.A.
33. Nancy L. Manzer, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation
of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL
L. REv. 628, 628 (1988).
34. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991);
Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993); Pfost v. State, 713
P.2d 495 (Mont. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc.,
776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980); Trujillo
v. City of Albuquerque, 798 P.2d 571 (N.M. 1990); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d
125 (N.D. 1978); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991); Condemarin v.
University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989); Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical
Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991).
35. A typical "open courts" provision reads as follows: "The courts shall be
open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial, or delay." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21. Some courts have held
that such provisions create a right to have meaningful access to the courts and that
damages limitations violate this right. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d
1080 (Fla. 1987); Kansas Malpractice Victims v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988);
Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988). The Alaska Constitution,
however, does not contain an "open courts" provision.
36. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985),
appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
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cap. Individuals in the former group receive full compensation for
their injuries, while those in the latter group do not.3V
In assessing an equal protection claim, a court must first
determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. Very few courts have
applied the highest level of scrutiny-the strict scrutiny test-to a
damages cap statute. 8 The debate has largely been over whether
to apply the lowest level of scrutiny-the rational basis test39-- or
the intermediate standard.' As a preliminary matter, courts must
decide whether the right to recover full monetary compensation for
tortious injury is a "substantial" or "important" right, or if it is
merely an ordinary right. If it is deemed an ordinary right, a
"statutory limitation on recovery is simply an economic regulation,
37. Additionally, some of the statutes that apply only to medical malpractice
actions or to lawsuits against a governmental entity create a further classification:
individuals who are injured due to the negligence of a health care provider or a
governmental entity are denied full recovery, while other tort victims are not. See,
e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-64-302 (Supp. 1993) (limiting recoverable damages in
medical malpractice actions to $1 million total, of which a maximum of $250,000
may be for noneconomic loss); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19 (Michie Supp. 1993)
(limiting liability of government entity or public employee acting within the scope
of duties to $600,000 for damage to or destruction of property; $300,000 for past
and future medical expenses; $400,000 for all damages other than property
damages or medical expenses to one person; and $750,000 for all claims other than
medical expenses arising out of a single occurrence).
38. See, e.g., Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1986), overruled on other
grounds by Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989). Under the
strict scrutiny test, the state's interest advanced by the statute must be compelling,
and the classification must be necessary to achieve the state's goal. A court will
apply this test only if the statutory classification infringes upon a fundamental right
or involves a suspect class. The Supreme Court has declared the following rights
to be fundamental: freedom of expression and association, NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); right of procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942); right to interstate movement, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1967); right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
and right to privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Suspect classes
include race, Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), and national origin, Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
39. This test requires that there be a reasonable relationship between the
classification that the statute creates and the objective that the statute seeks to
achieve. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
40. The U.S. Supreme Court has applied the intermediate level of scrutiny to
evaluate classifications based upon gender. Under this standard, the classification
created by the statute "must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); accord Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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which is entitled to wide judicial deference."4 Because very few
states have constitutional provisions that specifically forbid limits
on recovery for personal injuries,4' some courts, deeming the right
of a tort victim to be fully compensated worthy of a heightened
degree of scrutiny, have looked to other, more general constitution-
al provisions. For example, in Pfost v. State,43 the Montana
Supreme Court relied on the "speedy remedy" provision of the
state's constitution to apply a strict scrutiny test.44 Other courts
have relied on the history of the common law in their jurisdiction.
For example, in Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque,45 the New Mexico
Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny test, commenting that
"[t]he right to recover monetary damages for tortious injury has
played a vital role in New Mexico since before the time of
statehood."'  Therefore, even if there is not a constitutional
provision that guarantees the right to recover monetary damages
for tortious injury, courts may apply a heightened level of scrutiny
when restrictions are placed on this right.
The level of scrutiny utilized is critically important, as virtually
any statute will be upheld under the rational basis test. Courts
applying this standard almost always defer to the legislature's
determination that the classification created by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state objective. In Scholz v.
Metropolitan Pathologists, PC.,4 7 for instance, the Colorado
Supreme Court refused to consider the contention raised by the
plaintiff that the cap on noneconomic damages had been ineffective
in reducing insurance rates and lowering the cost of health care.
The court explained:
The [damages cap statute] was enacted in 1988 in response to
legislative findings which indicated severe problems concerning
health care availability due to the rising costs of insurance
premiums in Colorado.... [I]t is reasonable to assume that the
sometimes unpredictable and large damages that are awarded for
noneconomic injuries contribute to the rising cost of malpractice
insurance and thus, operate to limit the availability of health care
services. Consequently, the concerns that prompted the General
Assembly to pass the [act], as expressed in the declaration of
41. Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 531 (Va. 1989).
42. See, e.g., ARiz. CONsT. art. 18, § 6.
43. 713 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Meech v.
Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989).
44. MONT. CONST. art. m, § 6 ("Courts of justice shall be open to every
person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or
character .... ).
45. 798 P.2d 571 (N.M. 1990).
46. Id. at 574.
47. 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993).
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intent as well as the legislative history of the act, reasonably
support the passage of the act. The wisdom and effectiveness
with which the [act] might remedy the concerns sought to be
addressed are, of course not questions which this court will
entertain, for "we do not sit as a 'super legislature' to weigh the
propriety of... legislation."'
Thus, if a court applies the rational basis test, it will not likely
reexamine the legislative findings upon which the statute is based.
Conversely, under an intermediate scrutiny approach, the court
will evaluate whether the statute accomplishes what it set out to
achieve and whether the legislature accurately assessed the
situation that existed when the statute was enacted. In Moore v.
Mobile Infirmary Ass'n,4 9 for example, the Alabama Supreme
Court examined various studies to determine if the damages cap
effectively reduced the cost of medical malpractice insurance. 0
The court noted that the size of damage awards was only one of
several factors that influences the cost of malpractice insurance and
that there was not a consensus that damages caps were effective in
reducing insurance premiums." Concluding that "the correlation
between the damages cap.., and the reduction of health care costs
to the citizens of Alabama is, at best, indirect and remote"' and
that the cap imposed a direct burden upon the severely injured, the
court held the limitation to be unconstitutional.
In Carson v. Maurer,54 the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
like the Alabama Supreme Court in Moore, maintained that an
inquiry into the effectiveness of the statute in reducing the cost of
insurance was proper under an intermediate level of scrutiny.5
Skeptical that the damages cap at issue would have the effect
intended by the legislature, the court reasoned that, "'[flirst,
paid-out damage awards constitute only a small part of total
insurance premium costs. Second, and of primary importance, few
48. Id. at 907 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
49. 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991).
50. Id. at 167-68 ("To permit the legislature to act as the sole arbiter of such
juxtaposition, would be to vacate our judicial role.").
51. Id.
52. Id. at 168.
53. Id. at 170.
54. 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980).
55. Id. at 830. The court stated that the right to recover damages for personal
injury was "an important substantive right" and that the statute should therefore
"be subjected to a more rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed under the rational
basis test." Id.; see also Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976)
(remanding for additional factfinding to determine if the statute had been
successful in lowering the cost of liability insurance).
19941
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
individuals suffer noneconomic damages in excess of [the cap]."'56
This approach varies slightly from that in Moore. The Moore court
relied primarily on studies that showed there had not been a
reduction in insurance rates in jurisdictions with damages caps in
place. The Carson court, on the other hand, looked at the
legislature's theory behind the cap and found it to be unpersuasive.
Thus, the Carson approach was prospective, while the Moore
approach was more retrospective.57
While the Carson and Moore courts employed a means-end
test and focused on the effectiveness of the damages cap in
lowering malpractice insurance rates, other courts have been asked
to examine evidence that shows the absence of a crisis in their
state. As noted previously, state legislatures have justified statutory
limitations as an emergency measure mandated by an insurance
availability and cost crisis.5 Under an intermediate level of
scrutiny, however, courts will often consider whether there was an
actual crisis when the legislation was passed. In Arneson v.
Olson,59 for example, the North Dakota Supreme Court pointed
out that the number of malpractice claims in the state was far
below the national average and that insurance premiums were the
sixth lowest in the nation.6' Based on these findings, the court
concluded that there was not a crisis of availability or cost in North
Dakota and that the statute, therefore, violated the state's equal
protection guarantee.61
Similarly, in Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque,62 the New
Mexico Supreme Court maintained that it was necessary to review
statistical evidence in order to determine whether the statute was
constitutional under an intermediate level of equal protection
56. Id. at 836 (quoting R. Scott Jenkins & Wm. C. Schweinfurth, California's
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S.
CAL. L. REv. 829, 951 (1979)).
57. The different approaches can probably be attributed to the fact that Carson
was decided in 1980 and Moore in 1992. In 1980, less data was available to assess
the effectiveness of statutory limitations on recovery. Thus, the Carson court had
to look at the premise upon which the reform was based and analyze its
soundness. By contrast, the Moore court was able to draw upon numerous studies
conducted during the 1980's which showed that the damages caps had not been as
effective as many legislatures had anticipated.
58. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1993).
59. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
60. Id. at 136.
61. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-01 (1977) (repealed 1983); N.D.
CONST. art. I, § 21; art. IV, §§ 43, 44.
62. 798 P.2d 571 (N.M. 1990). The New Mexico damages cap applied only to
lawsuits against a government entity. See supra note 37.
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scrutiny.63 The court's analysis in Trujillo, however, focused on
whether there were alternative methods of accomplishing the goals
of the statute that were less restrictive of individual rights.' 4
Applying this "less restrictive alternative" approach, the court
remanded the case for a factual determination of whether such
options existed.65 The Trujillo court stressed the importance of
statistical evidence in determining the constitutionality of the
statute:
While it may be that in other cases this Court can assess whether
a substantial nexus exists between legislative means and ends
without the benefit of such an evidentiary record, here the
government's putative goal inextricably is tied to the risk of large
damage awards. The existence, nature, and magnitude of this risk,
as well as the justification for the means chosen to deal with it,
ultimately depend on empirical data.6
Thus, like the Alabama Supreme Court in Moore, the New Mexico
Supreme Court was willing to examine evidence regarding the
effectiveness of the statute in advancing the goal of the state.
In remanding the case, the court in Trujillo indicated that there
was a strong possibility of alternative means to advance the
objective of the State that were less restrictive of individual rights.
The court explained that few people receive awards in excess of the
cap, while the overwhelming majority of tort victims recover
damages for less than the cap.67 In such a case, the court indicat-
ed that "the state treasury would be better protected by allowing
only those persons with claims over the present liability cap to
recover, by limiting all persons with claims against the state to
recovery of a certain percentage of their incurred damages or by
some other means."' This "less restrictive alternative" emphasis
makes Trujillo unique, even among intermediate scrutiny cases.
63. The test under this intermediate level of scrutiny was whether the cap
'was substantially related to [an] important governmental interest."' Id. at 578
(quoting Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, 763 P.2d 1153, 1160 (N.M.
1988)).
64. Id. at 579-82.
65. Id. at 582.
66. Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 581 n.8.
68. Id. This line of reasoning contradicts that of the California Supreme Court
in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed,
474 U.S. 892 (1985). The Fein court stated, "Nor can we agree with amicus'
contention that the $250,000 limit is unconstitutional because the Legislature could
have realized its hoped-for cost savings by mandating a fixed-percentage reduction
of all noneconomic damage awards. The choice between reasonable alternative
methods for achieving a given objective is generally for the Legislature.... ." Id.
at 683.
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As the above discussion illustrates, in evaluating equal protec-
tion challenges to statutes that limit the recovery of damages, the
decision of which level of scrutiny to apply is outcome determina-
tive. If a court applies the rational basis test, the statute will
usually be held constitutional because lowering the cost of liability
insurance to keep health care affordable and to keep governmental
entities solvent is clearly a legitimate state interest. Moreover,
most courts will defer to the judgment of the legislature because
the rational basis standard merely requires that "the legislature
could have reasonably concluded that the challenged classification
would promote a legitimate state purpose., 69  Under this test,
courts do not consider evidence that the statute is ineffective or
that less restrictive alternatives were available to accomplish the
same goal. Conversely, under an intermediate level of scrutiny, a
court examines how well the statute achieves its stated purpose
and, in some cases, whether the statute was necessary in the first
instance. A. statutory damages cap usually fails this heightened
scrutiny test.
B. Substantive Due Process 0
Although most courts that have invalidated damages-limiting
statutes have relied on equal protection or right to jury trial
provisions, other courts have opted for a due process analysis. In
Morris v. Savoy,7 for example, the Ohio Supreme Court, unwill-
ing to strike down on equal protection grounds a $200,000 cap on
general damages that could be awarded in medical malpractice
actions, nonetheless held that the statute violated the state constitu-
tion's due process clause.72
Typically, however, courts that find legislation to be constitu-
tional under an equal protection analysis will conclude that the
legislation also passes the due process test.7' This result occurs
because "[s]ince 1937, the judicially articulated equal protection
standard for reviewing most social and economic legislation has
69. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196 (1983).
70. Although technically employing a due process analysis to scrutinize
damages limitations provisions, the analyses of these courts bear great similarity
to equal protection examinations. The due process analyses by these courts are
of particular importance to potential challengers of the damages cap in Alaska,
due to the similarity of the due process inquiry to Alaska's "sliding scale"
approach to equal protection analysis. See infra part IV.A.
71. 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991).
72. Id. at 771-72.
73. See, e.g., Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
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paralleled the due process standard."'74 As described above, the
lowest level of equal protection scrutiny requires that there be a
reasonable relationship between the classification that the statute
creates and the objective that the statute seeks to achieve.75
Similarly, under a due process analysis, the statute must "have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose., 76  This
similarity has allowed some courts to simultaneously reject both
due process and equal protection challenges to statutory damages
caps by applying essentially the same test to both claims.7
Despite this similarity, some courts view the two tests as
significantly different. In Condemarin v. University Hospital, for
example, the Utah Supreme Court expressed its preference for the
due process approach because, in the court's view, it offers greater
flexibility than the equal protection analysis.79 Under the equal
protection approach, the level of scrutiny the court chooses to
apply will almost always foreordain the outcome.80 The court
explained:
The difficulty with the equal protection analysis ... is that it
does not account for what is or what should be actually going on
in this Court's scrutiny of legislative abrogation of common law
causes of action. Characterizing plaintiff's rights here as "non-
fundamental" would virtually insure that the legislative action
will be found constitutional under the rational basis standard....
[S]ome commentators and a number of courts have incorporated
an intermediate or realistic level of scrutiny into their equal
protection framework in order to achieve the flexibility needed
to balance state interests against individual rights. I suggest that
a more open, straightforward performance of the balancing
function under the due process framework is in order.81
74. PAUL BREsT & SANFORD LEVINSON, THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING 549 (2d ed. 1983).
75. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
76. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
77. See, e.g., Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877 (W.
Va. 1991). The court held that the statute passed the equal protection test because
"the statute is rationally related to the legitimate state purpose." Id. at 886. In
considering the due process challenge, the court explained that "courts ordinarily
will not reexamine independently the factual basis for the legislative justification
for a statute. Instead, the inquiry is whether the legislature reasonably could
conceive to be true the facts on which the challenged statute was based." Id. at
887. Under such an approach, it is hard to conceive of any statute that could pass
the equal protection test and then fail to meet the requirements of due process.
78. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989).
79. Id. at 356-60.
80. Id. at 357. See supra part III.A.
81. Id. (footnote omitted).
1994]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
Under its due process "balancing analysis," the court in Condema-
rin was able to scrutinize the recovery limitation provision in the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act' much more closely than an
equal protection rational basis test would allow. The approach
allowed the court to "balance the weight of the governmental
interest at stake against the countervailing importance of the
individual rights being compromised."' To do so, the court first
evaluated the significance of the right that the legislation infringed
upon. The Utah Supreme Court then declared the right to receive
compensation in a suit for personal injuries to be a "substantial
property right."'  This right stems from the "open courts"
provision of the Utah Constitution, which provides that "[e]very
person, for an injury done to him in his person, 8 roperty or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.
' 'F
The court then weighed this "substantial property right"
against the interest of the state in preserving the public treasury.
Because the right involved was "substantial," the Condemarin court
placed the burden upon the state to show that the damages cap was
necessary: "[B]efore the state is permitted to conserve those
monies at the expense of seriously injured citizens, its citizens are
entitled to a showing in the courts that a measure so drastic and
arbitrary as a $100,000 cap on all damages is urgently and over-
whelmingly necessary." 6 The court also expressed concern with
the "crisis rationale" that the State used to justify the damages
limitation. It noted that, in times of crisis, individual rights are
especially susceptible to unconstitutional infringement. The
court also found insufficient evidence to support the contention
that the State's solvency was threatened: "There is no factual
showing in the legislative history or the trial court that the recovery
limitation is reasonably necessary for preservation of the public
treasury." 9  Thus, applying its due process balancing test, the
Condemarin court struck down the statute because the alleged
benefits of the cap were outweighed by the right of the individual
to be fully compensated for his injury.'
82. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-34 (1993).
83. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 358.
84. Id at 360 (quoting Hunter v. North Mason High Sch., 539 P.2d 845, 848
(Wash. 1975) (en banc)).
85. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11.
86. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 363.
87. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 362.
88. Id
89. Id. at 363.
90. Id. at 364.
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In Morris v. Savoy,9' another noteworthy due process case,
the Ohio Supreme Court adopted a similar approach. Although
the court held that the statute at issue, which limited damages for
medical malpractice to $200,000, 2 did not violate the equal
protection provision of Ohio's constitution, the court held that it
did violate due process.93 Under the equal protection analysis, the
court applied the "rational basis" test because the right involved
was not fundamental. 4 According to this standard, the court, in
deference to the legislature, would uphold the statute "'if there
exists any conceivable set of facts under which the classification
rationally furthered a legitimate state objective."'95  The court
then concluded that, "[a]ssuming the existence of a crisis in the
medical malpractice insurance area," the statute did not violate the
equal protection guarantee of the State.96
The court reasoned, however, that the due process provision
of the state constitution required more. In its due process analysis,
the Morris court had to "determine whether the method employed
[by the legislature] bears a 'real and substantial relationship' to
public health or welfare or whether it is 'unreasonable or arbi-
trary."'" In order to make such a determination, the court
examined whether the legislation was achieving its intended
purpose, reducing medical malpractice insurance rates.9 s Similar
to the conclusion of the Condemarin court, the Morris court found
no evidence to show that the $200,000 cap on damages affected
medical malpractice insurance rates.99 Accordingly, it held that
the statute did "not bear a real and substantial relation to public
health or welfare" and, thus, was a violation of due process.1
C. Right to Jury Trial
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects the right to trial by jury in civil actions. 1 The constitu-
91. 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991).
92. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Baldwin 1992).
93. Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 770-72.
94. Id. at 769-70.
95. Id. at 770 (citation omitted) (quoting Denicola v. Providence Hosp., 387
N.E.2d 231, 234 (Ohio 1979)).
96. Id. at 771-72.
97. Id. at 770.
98. Id. at 770-71.
99. Id. at 771.
100. Id.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The amendment provides: "In Suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of jury
trial shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined
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tions of all but two states contain a similar guarantee.', Critics
of damages caps contend that a determination of the amount of
damages is an issue of fact and, as such, is within the exclusive
province of the jury."° Other courts disagree, however, asserting
that, while the determination of damages is part of the fact-finding
duty of the jury, the remedy provided, the actual award, is a matter
of law.l( 4
In interpreting the right to jury trial, courts look to the
common law as it existed when the constitution was adopted."0 5
All state courts that have considered right to jury trial challenges
to statutory limitations on damages agree that, at the time their
state adopted the constitution, the assessment of damages was part
of the jury's role."° Additionally, these courts concur that the
jury set damages awards for pain and suffering."° Courts dis-
agree, however, on the extent to which the legislature may place
limits on the role of the jury.
Courts that have struck down damages caps as violative of the
right to jury trial have acknowledged that the legislature can
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law." Id
102. Colorado and Louisiana are the two exceptions. Colorado's constitution
does provide a right to jury trial, COLO. CONST. art. II, § 23 ("The right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases; but a jury in civil cases in all
courts, or in criminal cases in courts not of record, may consist of less than twelve
persons, as malt be prescribed by law."), but the Colorado Supreme Court has held
that this section does not guarantee a right to trial by jury in civil cases. See, e.g.,
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Broadnax, 827 P.2d 531 (Colo. 1992) (en banc)
(upholding statute requiring binding arbitration of personal injury protection
benefits disputes).
103. See, e.g., Kansas Malpractice Victims v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251,258 (Kan. 1988)
(The court stated that "[t]he right to jury trial, then, turns on the type of remedy
sought. It would be illogical for this court to find that a jury, empaneled because
monetary damages are sought, could not then fully determine the amount of
damages suffered.").
104. E.g., Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
105. See, e.g., Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 716 (Wash. 1989) (en
banc).
106. E.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 159 (Ala. 1991);
Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529; Sofie, 771 P.2d at 716.
107. See, e.g., Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., 789 P.2d 541, 551-52 (Kan.
1990). Some courts have pointed out that for damages which are not subject to
precise calculation, such as damages for pain and suffering, the jury's role is even
more essential. The Washington Supreme Court stated, "'[I]n cases where the
amount of damages was uncertain their assessment was a matter so peculiarly
within the province of the jury that the Court should not alter it."' Sofe, 771 P.2d
at 717 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 480 (1935)); see also Moore, 592
So. 2d at 160.
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modify the right to a jury trial and enact measures that shape
litigation.'" Thus, the legislature may allocate burdens of proof
and enact rules of evidence and procedure.0 9 These courts also
have reasoned that the legislature can modify the common law so
long as it provides an adequate substitute remedy for the right
infringed. 11
The essential question that most courts consider is "whether
the function of the jury has been impaired.""' In Sofie v. Fibre-
board Corp.," the Washington Supreme Court focused on the
word "inviolate" in the state's constitutional guarantee that "[t]he
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.""' The court defined
the term as "'free from change or blemish: pure, unbroken.., free
from assault or trespass: untouched, intact.""'" Based on this
definition, the court concluded that "[flor such a right to remain
inviolate, it must not diminish over time and must be protected
from all assaults to its essential guarantees.""'  Because the
determination of the quantum of damages was clearly an essential
role of the jury when the constitution of Washington was adopted
and because Washington's damages cap interfered with the
determination of the amount of damages by the jury, the Sofie
court struck it down.
The Alabama Supreme Court followed this same line of
reasoning in Moore:
The relevant inquiry is whether the function of the jury has been
impaired. Because the right to a jury trial "as it existed at the
time of the Constitution of 1901 was adopted must continue
'inviolate,"' the pertinent question "is not whether [the right] still
exists under the statute, but whether it still remains invio-
late. 11
6
108. E.g., Kansas Malpractice Victims v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251,258-59 (Kan. 1988).
109. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 789 (W.D. Va. 1986).
110. Kansas Malpractice Victims, 757 P.2d at 259. For example, workers'
compensation statutes are constitutional because the legislation provides an
adequate quid pro quo to both the employer and the employee. The employee is
liable regardless of fault, but, in return, there is a limit placed on the amount the
employee can recover. The employee gives up the right to recover damages above
the set limit but no longer has to prove negligence by the employer. Wright v.
Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ill. 1976).
111. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 163 (Ala. 1991).
112. 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
113. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21.
114. Sofie, 771 P.2d at 722 (alterations in original) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEw INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 1190 (1976)).
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 163-64 (quoting Alford
v. State ex rel. Att'y Gen., 54 So. 213, 218 (Ala. 1910) (alterations in original)
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The court determined that an essential function of the jury, since
the time the Alabama constitution was adopted, has been to assess
the amount of damages. Accordingly, the court concluded that the
statutory limitation impairs this essential function such that the
right would no longer be "inviolate.""' 7
The leading case upholding a damages cap in the face of a
right to jury trial challenge is Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospi-
tals."' The Etheridge court acknowledged the jury's role in
assessing damages, but limited the role to the initial determination.
It is then the duty of the court to apply the law.' 9 The court
articulated this rationale as follows: "A trial court applies the
remedy's limitation only after the jury has fulfilled its fact-finding
function. Thus.... [the damages cap] does not infringe upon the
right to a jury trial because the section does not apply until after a
jury has completed its assigned function in the judicial process.' 120
The Sofie court pointed out the absurdity of this line of reasoning,
contending that the approach in Etheridge places form over
substance: "In other words, a constitutional protection cannot be
bypassed by allowing it to exist in form but letting it have no effect
in function."''
IV. POSSIBLE CHALLENGES TO ALASKA STATUTES SECrION
09.17.010
A. Equal Protection
As discussed earlier," courts often wrestle with which level
of scrutiny to apply in equal protection challenges. Alaska courts,
however, are unconcerned with pigeonholing their analysis into one
of the three levels of scrutiny. Instead, they apply a single, uniform
analysis in evaluating equal protection claims." Thus, "'by
avoiding outright categorization of fundamental and
non-fundamental rights, a more flexible, less result-oriented analysis
(Mayfield, Sayre, & Evans, JJ., dissenting)).
117. Id. at 164.
118. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989), cited with approval in Murphy v. Edmonds, 601
A.2d 102,117 (Md. 1992); see also Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1195-96 (4th Cir.
1989).
119. Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529.
120. Id.
121. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 724 (Wash. 1989).
122. See supra part TlI.A.
123. See generally Michael B. Wise, Northern Lights-Equal Protection Analysis
in Alaska, 3 ALASKA L. REv. 1 (1986).
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may be made.""' 24
Alaska's "sliding scale" approach to equal protection challeng-
es resembles a due process balancing test. The Alaska Court of
Appeals described this sliding scale analysis as follows: "[T]he more
significant the individual right infringed, the more strictly this court
will scrutinize the legitimacy and importance of the state's purpose
and the link between that purpose and the statutory means to
effectuate it."'" The first step in the analysis, therefore, is to
determine the importance of the individual right involved. 6 The
Alaska Supreme Court has identified the right to redress wrongs
through the judicial process as "significant."' 27  Accordingly,
because the damages cap in Alaska prevents full redress for certain
wrongs, the statute would presumably be scrutinized more closely
than a regulation of an economic interest.'28
Even in cases towards the lower end of the sliding scale, the
Alaska courts have scrutinized legislation more closely than the
traditional rational basis test requires. The Alaska Supreme Court
has commented, "We are in agreement with the view that the
[U.S.] Supreme Court's recent equal protection decisions have
shown a tendency towards less speculative, less deferential, more
intensified means-to-end inquiry when it is applying the traditional
rational basis test and we approve of this development."' 29 Strict
scrutiny is also warranted because Alaska's equal protection clause
provides broader protection in all areas than the Federal Equal
Protection Clause. 
30
The Alaska Supreme Court has articulated its modified
rational basis test as follows: "[I]n order for a classification to
124. Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 437 n.38 (Alaska 1979)
(quoting State v. Erikson, 574 P.2d 1, 12 (Alaska 1978)).
125. Burnor v. State, 829 P.2d 837, 839 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992). In particular,
the sliding scale approach-in flexibly weighing the significance of the individual
right involved with the degree of scrutiny to be applied-is strikingly similar to the
due process analysis employed by the Utah Supreme Court in Condemarin v.
University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), see supra notes 78-90 and
accompanying text, and by the Ohio Supreme Court in Morris v. Savoy, 576
N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991), see supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
126. See Wilson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 669 P.2d 569, 572 (Alaska 1983)
(dictum).
127. Id. at 572.
128. See id. (noting that economic interests "have traditionally been afforded
minimal protection under equal protection analyses"). The right imperiled by the
damages cap is more analogous to the right to redress wrongs through the judicial
process than to "the interest in recovering from a 'deep pocket,"' which the Alaska
Supreme Court has declared to be only an economic interest. Id.
129. Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976).
130. Bumor v. State, 829 P.2d 837, 839 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
1994]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
survive judicial scrutiny, the classification 'must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.' 13 1
This standard is identical to the heightened scrutiny test that other
courts have employed in striking down damages caps.132 It is also
essentially the same as the intermediate standard that the United
States Supreme Court applies to classifications based upon
illegitimacy or gender.'33
By contrast, all courts that have upheld damages caps have
applied a lower level of scrutiny. For example, the Colorado
Supreme Court in Scholz v. Metropolitan Pathologists, P.C.,13
held that a cap was constitutional "so long as it is reasonable and
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective. 1 35
Similarly, the Virginia Supreme Court required only that the
legislation be reasonably related to a legitimate government
purpose."6  Therefore, whatever one chooses to label it, the
standard of review that will be applied to the cap on noneconomic
damages in Alaska will more closely approximate the rigorous test
applied by those courts that have rejected such provisions. When
an intermediate level of scrutiny is applied, it is extremely unlikely
that a damages cap would pass scrutiny.
131
When Alaska Statutes section 09.17.010 is challenged, the
inquiry will be whether the cap bears a fair and substantial relation
to the purpose it seeks to advance "when examining intensively the
means used and the reasons advanced therefor." 38 Thus, it will
be necessary to inquire into the effectiveness of the statute in
reducing the amount paid in personal injury claims and in lowering
131. State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 (Alaska 1973) (quoting F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
132. See, e.g., Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991) (striking down
$875,000 limitation for noneconomic loss in personal injury action); Carson v.
Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (striking down $250,000 limitation for
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice action).
133. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259,265 (1979); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
76-77 (1971).
134. 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993).
135. Id. at 906.
136. Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
137. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991);
Scholz v. Metropolitan Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993); Pfost v. State,
713 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Meech v. Hillhaven W.,
Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980);
Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 798 P.2d 571 (N.M. 1990); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
138. Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 363 (Alaska 1976).
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liability insurance rates. This inquiry will almost certainly render
the statute unconstitutional.
The plaintiff challenging the statute will be able to make two
strong arguments. First, the challenger will be able to point to
studies indicating that damages caps have not led to lower
insurance rates in other jurisdictions. 9 Second, the plaintiff will
be able to argue that, irrespective of what any statistics reflect, the
statute will be ineffective in lowering liability insurance rates.
Plaintiffs only rarely receive awards for noneconomic damages in
excess of the $500,000 cap." Moreover, the exception for cases
of disfigurement or severe physical impairment makes the cap
applicable in even fewer cases. The remaining cases subject to the
cap are highly unlikely to bring about a change in the liability
insurance industry. "Benefit to the public may be a rational basis
for a discriminatory classification, but the more speculative and
remote the benefit, the more arbitrary, is the discrimination."''
Thus, the cap does not meet the requirements of Alaska's rational
basis test that the statute have "a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation."'42 Moreover, the fact that the cap
applies so infrequently makes the statute extremely arbitrary. It is
therefore doubtful whether the damages cap provision could pass
139. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, SPECIAL COMM. ON MEDICAL
PROFESSIONAL LiAB., PROFESSIONAL LIABILrTY AND HEALTH CARE REFORM 16
(1993) (concluding that "[h]ealth care costs approximately doubled from 1982 to
1990 regardless of whether a state had enacted tort 'reforms' and regardless of the
types of 'reforms' enacted") (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH
CARE SPENDING - NONPOLICY FACTORS AcCOuNT FOR MOST STATE DIFFER-
ENCES (1992)); see also Paul Zwier & Dean Piermattei, Who Knows Best About
Damages: A Case for Courts' Rights, 93 DICK. L. RaV. 689 (1989); Randall R.
Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering,"
83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989).
140. The author was able to locate only four such cases in Alaska since the cap
was enacted in 1986. See Vanderpool v. Red Devil Corp., No. 4BE-91-178 Ci.
(Alaska Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1993); Pleasant v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., No.
4BE-88-007 CIV. (Alaska Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 1993); Balch v. Pierce-Pacific Mfg.,
Inc., No. A87-464 CIV (D. Alaska Apr. 12, 1991) ($1,484,000 award not reduced
because claim accrued before 1986); Heflin v. United States, No. A87-182 CIV (D.
Alaska Apr. 1989) ($1,134,000 award not reduced because claim accrued before
1986); see also Carson, 424 A.2d at 836 (holding that $250,000 cap on noneconomic
damages did not substantially advance State's goal because there are so few
awards that exceed this amount and because paid-out damage awards constitute
only a small part of total insurance premium costs).
141. Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp., 607 So. 2d 517, 523 (La. 1992) (Calogero,
C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3771 (U.S. May 18,1993) (No. 92-1487).
142. State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 (Alaska 1973).
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the part of the rational basis test requiring that the statute be
"reasonable not arbitrary."
The Alaska Supreme Court also has made it clear that it will
not defer to the legislature on the issue of the statutes' effective-
ness in achieving their intended objectives. In Turner Construction
Co. v. Scales,4' the court stated that when it considers whether
the statute substantially furthers the purpose of the State, it refuses
to "hypothesize facts which would sustain otherwise questionable
legislation."'" Thus, the Alaska Supreme Court will not uphold
the damages cap if there is evidence that shows that the limitation
will not reduce liability insurance rates.
The holding of the Alaska Supreme Court in Keyes v. Humana
Hospital Alaska, Inc.,45 provides particularly useful insight into
how the court might rule on an equal protection challenge to
Alaska Statutes section 09.17.010. The Keyes court upheld a
statute"46 that requires pre-trial review of medical malpractice
claims by an expert advisory panel and that makes the written
report of the panel admissible as evidence at the trial. 47 In
rejecting the equal protection claim, the court applied a relatively
low level of scrutiny under its "sliding scale" approach and stated
that "a conclusion that [the statute] bears a fair and substantial
relation to its purposes is unavoidable absent some showing by [the
plaintiff] that the statute is unlikely to encourage settlement and
reduce litigation over malpractice claims."'43 The court explained
why it was appropriate for the plaintiff to bear this burden:
[I]t is inappropriate for a court to preclude the legislature from
attempting to resolve a problem in a particular manner simply
because the intended results cannot be definitively demonstrated
in advance.. . . The "fair and substantial relation" test is met, in
a situation where the problem sought to be resolved is unique
and the possible techniques for its solution are therefore
untested, where the available evidence suggests the soundness of
the theory. The burden is upon those who attack the legislation
in such a case to show that it will not likely accomplish its
goal.149
143. 752 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1988).
144. Id. at 471-72 (holding that six-year statute of repose on suits against design
professionals violated the equal protection clause of Alaska because the statute
was not substantially related to State's goal of encouraging construction).
145. 750 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1988).
146. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (1983).
147. Keyes, 750 P.2d at 351-55.
148. Id. at 358 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 358 n.31 (quoting Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 385 A.2d 57, 79 (Md.
1978)).
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At first blush, the Keyes opinion looks like an obstacle to an
equal protection challenge to the damages cap in Alaska. The
court applied a "relatively low level of scrutiny," placed the burden
on the plaintiff to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the statute
and ultimately held that the statute was constitutional. 50 In fact,
however, the Keyes ruling will advance the cause of a litigant who
presents evidence of the statute's ineffectiveness. Although the
Keyes court placed the burden of proof on the party challenging
the statute, it nevertheless indicated its willingness to review
evidence that the statute was ineffective.' The court upheld the
statute, however, because the plaintiff failed to advance such an
argument. The willingness of the court to entertain this type of
examination into the effectiveness of the statute is encouraging to
potential challengers of the damages cap because it is the same
kind of inquiry that has led so many other courts to strike down
damages-limiting provisions. It is only when a court refuses to
conduct such an inquiry that damages caps have been upheld.5
Therefore, a litigant challenging Alaska Statutes section 09.17.010
on equal protection grounds will be afforded the opportunity to
make a factual showing that the $500,000 cap is not substantially
related to the objective of the statute, and there is ample evidence
to draw upon in making such a challenge.
In its defense of the damages cap, the State is also likely to
argue that, given the exception for victims of disfigurement or
severe physical impairment, meritorious claims will be unaffected
and only unjustifiably high awards will be controlled. As the New
Hampshire Supreme Court has pointed out, however, "society,
through the courts, has developed a remedy to secure itself from
the ills of a 'run-away' jury that has imposed a disproportionately
high award. That remedy is remittitur, to be exercised in the sound
discretion of the trial court."' 54 Moreover, whereas a damages
150. Id. at 358.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 165-70 (Ala.
1991).
153. See, e.g., Scholz v. Metropolitan Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901 (Colo.
1993); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992); Etheridge v. Medical Ctr.
Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
154. Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1237 (N.H. 1991). "Remittitur" is
defined as "[t]he procedural process by which an excessive verdict of the jury is
reduced." BLACK'S LAW DICroNARY 1295 (6th ed. 1990). The Alaska Supreme
Court has held that remittitur of a jury verdict is appropriate where "it is so large
as to strike us that it is manifestly unjust, such as being the result of passion or
prejudice or a disregard of the evidence or rules of law." Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434
P.2d 665, 676 (Alaska 1967).
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cap operates automatically, affecting both meritorious and
unjustifiable jury awards, a remittitur is determined on a
case-by-case basis and is limited to instances in which the jury
award is not supported by the evidence. 5 Additionally, when a
remittitur is ordered, the plaintiff can still exercise the option of a
new trial;" no such alternative exists when a damages cap is
applied. Therefore, a judicially-mandated remittitur is better suited
to control unjustifiably high damages awards than a legislative
damages limit.
In defending Alaska's damages cap, the State will likely
attempt to distinguish it from legislative damages limits that have
been invalidated in other jurisdictions. Alaska's cap applies only
to noneconomic damages, thereby allowing full recovery for all
pecuniary damages. As the Florida Supreme Court noted in
striking down a $450,000 limit on noneconomic damages, however,
"[t]he right to redress of any injury does not draw any distinction
between economic and noneconomic damages. 15 7 Moreover, the
Washington Supreme Court has stated that beyond determining
issues of fact, "the jury's role in determining noneconomic damages
is perhaps even more essential."'58  The significance of non-
economic damages has also been noted by the Alabama Supreme
Court, which declared them to be "that species of damages lying
most peculiarly within the jury's discretion." '59
Additionally, because the $500,000 limit is higher than many
other caps, the State may argue that the restriction on individual
rights is less severe than other damages caps. That fewer people
are affected by the cap, however, does not make it constitutional.
Indeed, such an argument can be turned on its head. When a cap
applies to only a handful of victims it becomes potentially even
more arbitrary. As explained by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court:
the defendants also argue that Carson is distinguishable because
the damages cap of $875,000 is three and one-half times as high
as the $250,000 cap at issue in Carson. The $875,000 cap, they
assert, is constitutional because it would burden the rights of
fewer tort claimants than the $250,000 cap.... Although fewer
tort plaintiffs would be affected by a $875,000 cap than by a cap
of $250,000, it seems to us even more "unfair and unreasonable
to impose the burden of supporting the [insurance] industry
solely upon those persons who are [even more] severely injured
155. See Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 721 (Wash. 1989).
156. Exxon Corp. v. Alvey, 690 P.2d 733, 742 (Alaska 1984).
157. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087 (Fla. 1987).
158. Sofie, 771 P.2d at 717.
159. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156,163 (Ala. 1991) (citations
omitted).
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and therefore [even more] in need of compensation." Moreover,
if the "fair and substantial relation" test could not be met
because "few individuals suffer non-economic damages in excess
of $250,000," we fail to understand how a cap of $875,000 could
meet the test simply because even fewer individuals would be
affected by the higher cap.' 60
Another argument the State will likely advance is that Alaska's
damages cap is more equitable than statutes of other states because
it contains an exception for the "severely" injured. Although
plausible in theory, in practice the exception has not worked. As
discussed in part II, courts have struggled with the question of
when the exception should apply. The outcomes have been
inconsistent and unpredictable.'6' If anything, because of its
uncertainty, the exception makes the statute even more arbitrary.
As this discussion reveals, and as one commentator has noted
regarding Alaska's "sliding scale" equal protection analysis, "the
Alaska Supreme Court has provided attorneys in Alaska with a
broad and powerful litigation tool for challenging state and local
government classifications."' 62  Therefore, when the Alaska
Supreme Court finally evaluates the state's damages cap, the equal
protection claim should provide a formidable challenge to the
constitutionality of the statute.
B. Right to Jury Trial
Article I, section 16 of the Alaska Constitution secures the
right to trial by jury in civil suits. This provision reads:
In civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeds two
hundred fifty dollars, the right of trial by a jury of twelve is
preserved to the same extent as it existed at common law. The
legislature may make provision for a verdict of not less than
three-fourths of the jury and, in courts not of record, may
provide for a jury by not less than six or more than twelve."6
Additionally, Rule 38(a) of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure
states, "The right of trial by jury as declared by section 16 of article
I of the constitution, or as given by statute of the state, shall be
preserved to the parties inviolate.""
When Alaska adopted its constitution in 1959, the right to have
a jury determine the amount of damages in a tort action was part
160. Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1236-37 (N.H. 1991) (alteration in
original) (quoting Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 836-37 (N.H. 1980)).
161. See supra part II.
162. Wise, supra note 123, at 2.
163. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16.
164. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 38(a).
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of the common law."6 The amount a jury could award under the
law was not statutorily limited, as the jury's determination of
damages could be reduced only by court-ordered remittitur. The
court has never addressed the constitutionality of a provision that
places a limit on the amount a plaintiff may receive. As indicated
in prior discussion," if the Alaska Supreme Court evaluates a
right to jury trial challenge to Alaska Statutes section 09.17.010, the
decision would probably turn on whether the court believes the
damages remedy is a matter of law or a matter of fact.
One way a court can uphold a damages cap when faced with
a right to jury trial challenge is to hold that the legislature has
provided an adequate substitute remedy for the right infringed, or
a quid pro quo.'6 7 In Alaska Structures, Inc. v. Alaska Totem
Electric Enterprises, Inc.,ci the Alaska Supreme Court demon-
strated its willingness to consider a quid pro quo as justification for
limiting a plaintiff's workers' compensation claim. The court
stated:
In accomplishing the goal of securing adequate compensation for
injured employees without the expense and delay inherent in a
determination of fault as between the employee and the
employer, the legislature apparently also found it necessary to
limit the total amount of the employer's liability to the statutory
award. We have concluded that there is a fair and substantial
relationship between the legislative objective of providing
guaranteed, expeditious compensation to the injured employee
and the limitation on the employer's total liability ....
Although the right to jury trial was not at issue in Arctic Structures,
the case may indicate a receptiveness of the Alaska Supreme Court
to a quid pro quo defense asserted in response to a right to jury
trial claim. Even if the court was willing to consider such a
defense, though, the State would still have to show that the
damages limitation provides an additional remedy to compensate
for the impairment to the right to jury trial, again facing the
difficult task of establishing public benefits from such a provi-
sion.7 0
165. The Alaska Supreme Court has held that when part of the relief sought is
compensatory and punitive damages, the Alaska Constitution guarantees the right
to a jury trial. Loomis Elec. Protection, Inc. v. Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341, 1344
(Alaska 1976). Additionally, the Alaska Supreme Court has stated that "[t]here
has always been a strong policy favoring jury trials in Alaska." Id. at 1344 n.16.
166. See supra part Ill.C.
167. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
168. 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979).
169. Id. at 437.
170. See supra notes 139-144 and accompanying text.
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In addition to the quid pro quo rationale, a court may uphold
a damages cap that allegedly violates the right to jury trial by
holding that a remedy is a matter of law. If a remedy is considered
a matter of law, then a damages cap would be constitutional
because "[a] trial court applies the remedy's limitation only after
the jury has fulfilled its fact-finding function., 171 As previously
discussed,'72 though, this line of reasoning has been widely
criticized for placing form over substance. It allows the jury to
make a factual determination which the courts will ignore in some
cases. "Such an argument pays lip service to the form of the jury
but robs the institution of its function."'73  Moreover, when a
damages cap is applied, the determination of the jury is less than
advisory, and, unlike a remittitur, the plaintiff does not have the
option of asking for a new trial.
In Keyes v. Humana Hospital Alaska, Inc., 4 the Alaska
Supreme Court rejected a right to jury trial claim, in addition to the
previously mentioned equal protection challenge. 75 The plaintiff
in Keyes argued that allowing the written report of a medical
expert panel into evidence at the trial violated her right to a jury
trial because the jury would give too much weight to the panel's
report.76 The court held that the report was analogous to an
expert opinion that the jury could evaluate just as it weighed the
rest of the evidence in the case. 77 The jury still remained the
ultimate arbiter of the issues of fact.' 78
Justice Burke, however, dissented from the Keyes opinion and
would have invalidated the pretrial screening panel as a violation
of the right to a jury trial. Justice Burke stated that jurors might
give undue deference to the report of the panel because they might
perceive the opinions expressed in the report to be those of the
court. 79  Furthermore, Justice Burke rejected the majority's
contention that the report simply functioned as another expert
witness: An expert witness is subjected to cross-examination,
whereas the report is not."'u In concluding his dissent, Justice
Burke wrote:
171. Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. 1989).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 119-121.
173. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 721 (Wash. 1989).
174. 750 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1988).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 145-152.
176. Keyes, 750 P.2d at 346.
177. Id. at 346-47.
178. Id. at 347.
179. Id at 360 (Burke, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 361 (Burke, J., dissenting).
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If juries are incapable of making rational decisions in medical
malpractice cases based upon the evidence placed before them
by the parties, then the flaw is in the jury system itself, and it is
the Constitution, not the rules of civil procedure, which must be
changed. In the meantime, we are sworn to protect the constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to trial by jury against any scheme
designed to frustrate its utilization or undermine its purposes.'
Although Justice Burke is no longer on the court, given the
strength of this language in defense of the right to a jury trial, his
dissent in Keyes could provide the rationale for a future invalida-
tion of the damages cap in Alaska.
Such a reversal of the damages cap would be consistent with
the common law right to jury trial. If the Alaska Supreme Court
refuses to strike down Alaska Statutes section 09.17.010, the right
to jury trial will be different from that right as it existed at common
law. Alaska Statutes section 09.17.010 does not allow a jury to
determine damages for catastrophically injured plaintiffs; there was
no such limitation at common law. Therefore, in order to preserve
the right to jury trial "to the same extent as it existed at common
law,' 182 the cap must be struck down.
V. CONCLUSION
When the Alaska Supreme Court faces a challenge to the
constitutionality of Alaska Statutes 09.17.010, the court's determina-
tion will hinge on its assessment of the equal protection and jury
trial rights. As noted, Justice Burke's dissent in Keyes contains
compelling language which defends the importance of the right to
jury trial."s Justice Burke reasoned that the role of the courts
was to "protect the constitutionally guaranteed right to trial by jury
against any scheme designed to frustrate its utilization or under-
mine its purpose."'" If the court accepts this view of its role, it
will strike down the damages cap.
Even if the court were to find that the cap did not violate the
right to jury trial, it would likely strike the limitation down on
equal protection grounds. Alaska's "sliding scale" analysis, coupled
with the Alaska Supreme Court's recognition that the right to
redress wrongs through the judicial process is "significant," will
make it extremely difficult for the damages-limiting statute to
survive judicial scrutiny. Additionally, the confusion and incongrui-
ty of outcomes that the legislation has engendered among the lower
courts can only add to the challenge that the State will face in
181. Id. (emphasis added) (Burke, J., dissenting).
182. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16.
183. Keyes, 750 P.2d at 361.
184. IM
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defending the statute. The cap is not substantially related to
reducing the cost of liability insurance, and it is arbitrary. Indeed,
it is the arbitrary nature of the statute that makes it so unfair. As
a former Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court comment-
ed:
The idea of preserving insurance by imposing huge sacrifices on
a few victims is logically perverse. Insurance is a device for
spreading risks and costs among large numbers of people so that
no one person is crushed by misfortune. In a strange reversal of
this principle, [a] statute [limiting damages] concentrates the
costs of the worst injuries on a few individuals.1"
Until Alaska's damages cap is overturned, the handful of victims
who have suffered the most severe injuries will continue to bear the
burden for the rest of society in a fruitless and illogical experiment
to lower insurance rates.
Kevin Sean Mahoney
185. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 690 (Cal. 1985) (Bird,
C.J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1986).
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